Western Sahara: Against Autonomy, by Jacob Mundy

Western Sahara In recent years, the Moroccan government has championed the idea of autonomy as a solution to its territorial dispute with pro-independence advocates over Western Sahara. Rabat has said it is willing to consider an autonomous, locally elected government in Western Sahara, which would have powers independent of the central government, albeit circumscribed by Morocco's ultimate sovereignty. The movement for Western Saharan statehood, on the other hand, has rejected autonomy. It continues to claim the right of self-determination, to be exercised through a final status referendum among the territory's indigenous ethnic Sahrawis.

There is a broad international consensus, political and juridical, backing the right of self-determination in former European colonies. This consensus was applied most recently in East Timor. Jacob Mundy
Foreign Policy In Focus
International Relations Center (I.R.C.)
May 4, 2007
Western Sahara, like East Timor, was a European colony until the mid-1970's. In a landmark 1975 ruling, the International Court of Justice dismissed Morocco's historical claims to Western Sahara and instead supported the Sahrawis' right to self-determination. The United Nations Security Council and secretary general have both reiterated their support for a solution that provides for self-determination, which would entail a vote including, but not limited to, the option of independence.

From 1988 to 1999, the Security Council attempted to hold a vote on self-determination in Western Sahara. Then, in 2000, the discourses started shifting away from self-determination to a "third way" that was neither independence nor integration with Morocco. Autonomy has become that "third way" solution, and it seems like the best compromise on paper. Yet, when mapped onto the realities of the conflict, autonomy becomes a recipe for disaster—both at the negotiating table and on the ground in Western Sahara.

Though the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations had provided material support for Morocco's invasion and occupation of Western Sahara from 1975 to 1991, the first Bush and Clinton administrations maintained a hands-off policy toward the early United Nations referendum process (1992-1996). Indirect, high-level American involvement—in the form of former Secretary of State James Baker—began in 1997. However, Baker's seven-year engagement was sabotaged, on the American side, by larger geo-strategic concerns: Morocco's role as an ally in—and after May 2003 a site of—the war on terror. The United States government's attitude toward the conflict since then has been to leave it to the parties to make their own proposals while discretely encouraging autonomy.

Stalemate
The stalemate in Western Sahara was originally achieved on the battlefield during a 16-year war pitting Western-supported Morocco against the Algerian-backed Sahrawian guerrillas of the Polisario Front. The armed conflict ended in 1991 when the Security Council backed an agreement to hold a referendum on independence, but only with the consent of the two parties, most importantly Morocco. Several hundred United Nations peacekeepers began monitoring the ceasefire in 1991. Five years later, and no closer to a vote, the United Nations seriously considered a withdrawal. Then, in 1997, former Secretary of State James Baker agreed to mediate the dispute.

During his seven-year tenure as the United Nations secretary general's personal envoy to Western Sahara, Baker was the center of gravity in the peace process. He originally brokered a series of agreements that revived the referendum process in 1997. However, when it was time to hold a vote in 2000, the Security Council decided that a referendum was no longer realistic. Behind the scenes, the Clinton administration also backed away from a referendum and instead supported the new regime in Morocco under King Mohammed VI. To avoid the kind of dangerous referendum the Security Council had botched in East Timor, Baker started searching for an alternative to an independence/integration referendum. However, in 2002, the Security Council said that it would consider any peace proposal so long as it provided for self-determination (i.e., a referendum on independence).